Marawi terror group: an ISIS franchise?

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BY AMBASSADOR BAYANI V. MANGIBIN (Ret.)
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Thursday. September 21, 2017
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THE ISLAMIC State of Iraq & Syria (ISIS) rose to global prominence like a flash of lightning. After only one month from June 29, 2014 when the reestablishment of the Caliphate was proclaimed, ISIS already controlled several territories in August 2014.

However, the ISIS’ power began to crumble before 2015 ended. As of July 2017, the Global Coalition against Daesh reported that ISIS has lost 75 percent of the occupied territories in Iraq and 65 percent in Syria. As the natural, cultural and economic resources of the said territories are the main sources of ISIS wealth, the once richest terrorist organization is now under heavy financial pressure. Its reduced resources (monetarily and manpower-wise) and the massive airstrikes by the Coalition pressured ISIS to be militarily defensive.

ISIS has adapted a strategic response to this situation. It adopted a diversionary tactic. ISIS directives have increasingly encouraged its followers to conduct more attacks in their respective localities to distract the Coalition from concentrating its military operations in the core areas of Iraq and Syria.  From the strategy of territorial conquest and state building, ISIS has shifted to the strategy of encouraging more military engagements by its global network of followers. As highlighted in my column last week (9/11 and 7/11 Franchising models), this strategy is based on “franchising of terror business” by ISIS as franchisor and the network of followers  as chain of  franchisees.

The followers are either categorized as sympathizers, allies, and affiliates.  Each category represents a particular type of connection and the extent of their commitment to ISIS and its ideology. The “sympathizers” share the ideology or purpose of ISIS but have no structural linkage with ISIS. They are described more as “ISIS-inspired.” The group of lone wolf terrorists is the best example of this category. The “allies” are terror groups who pledged allegiance (bay’ah) to Caliph al-Baghdadi but has not been given official recognition and proclaimed as a wilayat or a province. Thus, the relationship is informal and more symbolic It is categorized as “ISIS-enabled”. On the other hand, “affiliates” are terror groups who pledged bay’ah and recognized as wilayah. In short, there is a formal organizational relationship where system of command and control exists. Thus, the affiliates are considered “ISIS-directed”. The distinction of these three categories is important. It provides proper understanding of the strategy of franchising terror which will be helpful in making assessment on the Marawi terror group.

Based on Open Source Intelligence (OSINT), two serious developments were reported to have taken place in mid-January 2016. The first was ISIS announcement on the unification of “battalions of God’s fighters”. This unified force (described as Marawi terror group or simply the Group) is composed of the following four groups who had pledged allegiance (Bay’ah) to Caliph al-Baghdadi: Ansar Al-Shariah, Marakah Al Ansar, Ansarul Kilafah, and Al Harakatul Islamiyah (Abu Sayyaf). The second was the unverified ISIS Shuria Council anointment of Isnilon Hapilon aka Abu Abdullah al Filipini as Emir of the alleged “Islamic State of the Philippines”.

The above OSINT implies compliance of the Marawi terror group on two of the three basic requirements of ISIS to qualify as its ally or affiliate. The first requirement is the unification of existing groups. The need for unified front is imperative to ensure maximized consolidation of forces and deployment of manpower and resources substantial enough to sustain operation.  On the selection of Hapilon, an Emir is needed for strategic direction/ coordination and command and control. The appointment of an Emir is also essential to show that a formal leadership structure for Islamic State is in place.

The third and major basic requirement is taking control of a territory to govern. This is the only requirement that the Group was not able to achieve. AFP Chief General Eduardo Ano asserted that the Group “wanted to seize the city and declare it an Islamic Caliphate on the first day of Ramadan.”

There are issues that need clarification to assess properly the Marawi terror group. The most dominant issue is that the name, “Islamic State of the Philippines”, was not even mentioned by any of the stakeholders in the crisis (the Marawi terror group/Group, military, media, and the residents) from May 23 up to this time. The Group is described most of the time as Maute, or sometimes as Maute-ISIS. This confirms that there is no official recognition given by ISIS to the Group. Their bay’ah was presumed to have been accepted as implied from the ISIS involvement in the unification of the four battalions and anointment of Hapilon as Emir.

The other issue is Hapilon’s weakness as Emir. The crisis stakeholders have not addressed Hapilon with his nom de guerre, Abu Abdullah al Filipini, in deference to his position as Emir. The ISIS refer to its leader with his nom de guerre, Caliph Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, and has never used his real name, Ibrahim Awad Ibrahim al-Badri.  It is also intriguing that the head of Abu Sayaf is Radulan Sahiron and Hapilon is only the Deputy Head. This could imply probable split in the Abu Sayyaf which could adversely affect the unity of the Group. It is also noticeable that the Maute brothers perform dominantly in the Group, particularly in planning (with Omar being considered as the “brain”), operation (with Abdullah in charge of military operations) and financing (with the funds and connections of Farhana and Cayamora Maute). This creates instability in the leadership structure of the Marawi terror group.

With the above issues of concern and using the framework of ISIS-IED which stands for ISIS- Inspired, Enabled and Directed (not the Improvised Explosive Device),  the Marawi terror group is more than an ISIS-inspired. It could be placed under the category of ISIS-enabled rather than ISIS-directed. The Group’s relationship with ISIS is informal with no structural linkage. It is primarily symbolic and based on communications (mostly online video sharing) which is not characteristic of command and control. It implies that it is not an ISIS franchise like ISIS-directed type. The Marawi terror group’s connection to ISIS is not entrenched in its commitment to ISIS and ideology. The display of black flag and showing ISIS-inspired videos and documents in the social media by the Group are mere publicity stunts to project an image of being backed up by ISIS and perpetuate wide-spread news of their savagery and barbarism to condition the mind of the population of the Group’s invincibility.

The Marawi terror group is more an opportunistic group that wants to ride on the financial resources and notoriety of ISIS in the international terror market. It should be noted that they pledged bay’ah several times and as early as 2014 but they were never acknowledged by ISIS. The presumption of acceptance of their bay’ah took place after two years in 2016. It is asserted that the acceptance was triggered by ISIS desperate need to encourage more terror groups in their side to conduct military engagements in their localities.

The commitment to ISIS and its ideology has been put to question after one of the Marawi terror groups (Abu Sayyaf) threatened to behead a German hostage but released later the hostage upon payment of substantial ransom. They were more concerned with money (where the phrase “IN GOD WE TRUST” is printed) rather than the ideology of the “God’s fighters”.

Per assessment on the OSINT regarding the unified battalions, many terrorism experts consider the durability of the unified position of the four battalions as untenable. The experts pointed out that tribalism and common banditry prevalent among the terror groups work against such stability. It is important to note that the four battalions are all small entities (compared to MILF and MNLF) and none appears to have well defined organizational structure for carrying out a sustained acts of violence and operational capability.  The threat of instability is also noted in the leadership structure of the Marawi terror group.  The noticeable weakness of Hapilon’ as Emir is predicted to trigger self-destruction of the Marawi terror group.

The assessment on the OSINT and the extent of the Marawi terror group connection to ISIS (franchising) provides a negative prognosis. It envisioned a short life-span of the Marawi terror group. It is hoped that the Marawi crisis will soon end and with it is the downfall of the Marawi terror group and the other terrorist groups. However, there is a need for vigilance.

The United Nations September 2017 Monthly Forecast on Counter-Terrorism reported that the ISIS “continues to establish a foothold in South-East Asia.” Terrorism Expert Rohan Gunaratna pointed out ISIS’ determination to declare at least one province in Asia, singling out the Philippines, specifically Mindanao, as the “possible epicentre of ISIS activity in Southeast Asia.” The alleged al Baghdadi’s call for foreign fighters to support their brother Muslims in Mindanao is a real source of serious concern.

The historic continuity of Mindanao groups splitting into factions (like MNLF to MILF to BIFF with the latter splitting later into three factions) impedes a durable establishment of an ISIS-directed group; thus, the big question mark of Mindanao becoming the Southeast Asian hub of ISIS terrorism. However, possibility exists that such threat can transform into reality due to complacency. This makes it imperative to act appropriately and immediately to have enduring peace in Mindanao to avoid making this Land of Promise an ungovernable space vulnerable to violent extremism from ISIS.

Military operations and martial law never succeeded in ending the conflicts in Mindanao. It is about time to offer a political solution by implementing a comprehensive peace agreement through the passage of an acceptable enabling law. This move is a strategic pre-emption to ISIS “franchising of terror business” in the Philippines. (ambaniman@gmail.com/PN)
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