THE PROBLEM with the Buhang Flyover in Iloilo City goes beyond cracks in concrete — there are cracks in the system.
When Public Works Secretary Vince Dizon bluntly declared that substandard workmanship — not overloading — caused Buhang Flyover’s structural defects, he did more than correct a narrative. He exposed a more uncomfortable truth: infrastructure failures in this country are often not accidents. They are the result of systemic weaknesses that have long been tolerated.
Yes, the immediate response is reassuring. The contractor has been ordered to redo defective portions at its own expense. Repairs are being rushed. Targets are being set. But let us not confuse action with reform. Fixing the Buhang Flyover is necessary. Fixing the system that allowed it to fail is imperative.
Iloilo has seen its share of troubled infrastructure — projects delayed, structures questioned, and public patience stretched thin. From prolonged construction timelines to recurring defects, a pattern emerges: we build, we celebrate, we discover flaws, and then we fix — often at great inconvenience to the public. It is a cycle of reaction, not prevention.
Question: how did a P315-million flyover project pass through design, approval, construction, and inspection — only to reveal compromised integrity after opening?
The answers point to three critical fault lines: procurement, monitoring, and execution.
Are contracts being awarded based purely on the lowest bid, rather than the highest competence? The “lowest bidder wins” culture may save money on paper, but it often results in higher costs in the long run — repairs, delays, and economic losses that no balance sheet initially reflects.
And where were the safeguards during construction? Quality control should not begin after defects appear. It should be relentless, independent, and uncompromising from day one. Regular third-party audits, stricter material testing, and real-time oversight mechanisms must become standard, not optional.
Of course, execution matters. The admission of “substandard workmanship” raises questions about supervision on the ground. Were engineers and inspectors vigilant enough? Or has complacency quietly crept into a system that has grown too used to cutting corners?
And then there is accountability.
Ordering a contractor to redo the work is a start — but it is not enough. True accountability demands consequences that deter repetition. Blacklisting erring contractors, penalizing negligent supervisors, and publicly disclosing findings should be part of a broader reform agenda. Without this, the message remains weak: fail, fix, and move on.
The Buhang Flyover should not simply be repaired and forgotten. It should be remembered as a turning point — a case that forced government agencies, contractors, and the public to demand better. Ilonggos deserve projects that are built to last. Anything less is not just poor workmanship. It is poor governance.
