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BY AMBASSADOR BAYANI V. MANGIBIN (Ret.)
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Thursday. September 14, 2017
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FOUR days ago from today, the commemoration of the 16th anniversary of the tragic incident of September 11 or 9/11 brought back traumatic memories. I remember I slept early on that day and a phone call from a reporter woke me up. He told me to open immediately the television in time for me to see the second hijacked plane slammed on the South Tower of the World Trade Center.
The reporter asked for my comments on this shocking news. He was under the impression that I was still the Spokesman of the Department of Foreign Affairs. He was not aware that I was just reassigned on the morning of that day as the Department’s Assistant Secretary for Strategic Planning and Policy Coordination. I did not give him any comment. I was more a spooked man rather than spokesman after watching the shocking news. I felt having a nightmare while awake. I became apprehensive on what 9/11 foretells as the date 9/11 contains the numbers (911) which connote a call for emergency or danger.
Sixteen years after 9/11, terrorism has changed tremendously our way of life. The fatwa issued by Osama bin Laden and Ayman al Zawahiri in February 1998 fostered uncertainty, threat and fear of terrorism almost every day. In this fatwa, they claimed that America declared war against God and his messenger and, thus, called upon all Muslims to murder Americans anywhere in the world without distinguishing military or civilian. Unfortunately, the casualties of 9/11 were almost all civilians than military and they were not only Americans but also from more than 90 countries by citizenship or ethnicity. The whole world has become the terrorist’s battle field.
Before 9/11, Al Qaeda (AQ) was a monolithic Sunni organization. It expanded later with two branches: al-Qaeda in Iraq or AQI (September 2004) and Al Nusra Front also known as al-Qaeda in Syria or al-Qaeda in the Levant (January 2012). After the death of AQI leader Abu Musab al Zarqawi (2008), AQI became Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) under Omar al-Baghdadi and later changed name to Islamic State of Iraq & Syria (ISIS) under Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. AQ disenfranchised ISIS in February 2014 for operating in Syria (being allowed by AQ to operate only in Iraq) and attempting to take control over al Nusra Front, the AQ –authorized branch in Syria. After the ISIS separation and announcement of the establishment of Caliphate in June 2014, ISIS became more aggressive than AQ and gained more notoriety for its sheer savagery. True to its name, its Arabic acronym DAESH (“al-Dawla al-Islamiya al-Iraq al-Sham”) resembles the Arabic word Daes which means “one who sows discord”.
Adapting to AQ’s complete decentralization after 9/11 and ISIS decline in late 2015 due to sustained military pressure of US and other allies, both organizations adopted an operational strategy for maximizing the use of resources, personnel, and movement through their affiliates to expand their presence in the global terror market. This expansion strategy is anchored through franchising of terror business to affiliates-franchisees to spread violence and fear in their localities.
In this business expansion strategy, AQ and ISIS are franchisors that grant the franchisee (terror group affiliates) the privilege of using their respective trademark with set of strategic guidance and monitoring of compliance to maintain central control. This terror franchising model which mushroomed after 9/11 can be labelled as 9/11 model to make a distinction from the typical commercial arrangement of franchising like the 7-11 model.
Recent developments validate the observation that ISIS brand is more effectively franchised than the AQ brand. This is made evident by widespread news of deliberate acts of violence attributed to ISIS franchisees (affiliates) which clearly exhibited ISIS trademark of terror. The massive use of the black-and-white ISIS flag is an authentication of successful usage of the affiliates to their ISIS franchise. The adoption of the affiliates of the term “wilayats” (provinces) and its increasing number are another confirmation of an effective franchising.
From the point of view of mutual benefit typical of franchising, ISIS as a franchisor benefitted from the projection of stronger image of invincibility propped up by the active operations of its affiliates-franchisees despite series of setbacks in Iraq and Syria. On the other hand, the ISIS trademark of the affiliates-franchisees enhances their image as being backed up by a powerful organization which facilitates their local recruitment, logistical support, and fundraising.
The increasing number of jihadists leaving Iraq and Syria creates a conducive environment for the growth of affiliates-franchisees in countries fertile for ISIS franchising. While there is no confirmed number of Filipino jihadists who fought in Iraq and Syria, it cannot be discounted that experienced foreign fighters from the conflicts in Iraq and Syria who refused to return to their respective countries of origin might continue their adventure in the Philippines. It will be recalled that no less than ISIS leader Abu Bakr al Baghdadi called for foreign fighters to support their Muslim bothers in Mindanao if they cannot join the fight in Iraq and Syria.
More details on this threat will be the subject of my next column in Thursday entitled, Marawi Terror: An ISIS Franchise? (ambaniman@gmail.com/PN)
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