NEGROS Occidental is facing a perfect storm.
Three major crises are simultaneously battering the province: the resurgence of the red-striped soft scale insect (RSSI) that is ravaging sugarcane plantations, the spread of African swine fever (ASF) that continues to threaten the hog industry, and the United States’ ban on Philippine crab products that has severely affected the blue swimming crab industry.
Quite alarming.
Among these, however, the most pressing concern is the RSSI crisis.
Why?
Because the reinfestation of RSSI, which has already damaged more than 12,000 validated hectares of sugarcane plantations, ultimately raises questions about preparedness and complacency.
RSSI, an invasive pest believed to have originated from Russia, first appeared in the Philippines in Luzon in 1992.
Given that history, one would expect the Sugar Regulatory Administration (SRA) to have already developed an effective strategy long before the pest reached Negros Island early last year.
The lingering question therefore remains:
Why does the SRA now appear almost helpless in containing the outbreak?
And why is it pushing the provincial government to declare a state of calamity over the reinfestation?
Can the agency no longer fight this plague on its own?
CAN’T STAND ALONE
Let us be clear about one thing.
During the June 23 high-level conference at the Provincial Capitol, SRA officials led by Administrator Pablo Luis Azcona presented data on the spread of RSSI across Negros, Panay and parts of Leyte beginning this summer.
In Negros Occidental alone, validated reports show that the pest has already infested 12,332 hectares of sugarcane farms.
While alarming, that figure represents only about six to seven percent of the province’s estimated 189,000 hectares of sugar plantations.
That percentage still falls below the threshold required by the National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council (NDRRMC) for the declaration of a province-wide state of calamity due to agricultural losses.
In other words, the RSSI problem, by itself, may not yet legally justify such a declaration.
Yes, Negros Occidental technically remains under a state of calamity declared last year.
However, that declaration primarily stemmed from the devastation caused by Typhoon Crising. The initial RSSI infestation merely served as a secondary justification.
The question now is what other legal and practical options remain available for the provincial government to help the SRA contain the rapidly spreading infestation.
THE MATHEMATICS OF RSSI
This is where the controversy begins.
During the same conference, SRA claimed it had already spent more than P200 million to contain the first wave of RSSI.
Wait a minute.
If over P200 million has already been spent, why is RSSI still spreading across Negros?
Naturally, the public is asking one question: Where did the P200 million go?
In a June 25 press statement, the Confederation of Sugar Producers’ Associations Inc. (CONFED) detailed the funding sources behind the P200-million program, which included allocations from SIDA, the SRA Corporate Operating Budget, fertilizer distribution projects, the Block Farm Program, emergency funds and other corporate resources.
The money clearly came from several funding windows.
But what were the measurable accomplishments?
The uncomfortable reality is that RSSI remains destructive — not only to sugarcane but reportedly to virtually any leafy crop, including rice, corn and vegetables.
That is the mathematics many farmers simply cannot understand.
GOOD FUNGI
Then came another interesting twist.
Agriculture Secretary Francisco Tiu Laurel Jr. said the long-term answer lies in the mass production of beneficial fungi capable of naturally controlling RSSI populations.
The Agriculture secretary has even instructed the SRA to scale up production, assuring that the Department of Agriculture (DA) has enough funds to support the initiative.
If that is indeed the solution, then another question naturally follows: Why is there still an urgent push for a state of calamity?
If the DA is ready to finance the production of beneficial fungi, what exactly is preventing the immediate implementation of the program?
Ironically, this is not even a new technology. As early as last year, the SRA’s La Granja Agricultural Research and Extension Center in La Carlota City had already begun culturing entomopathogenic fungi sourced from Roxas City, Capiz, and Bago City.
So what happened to that initiative? Did it fail? Or did it simply fail to reach the farmers who needed it most?
EPICENTER OF THE CONTROVERSY
Whether fair or not, the SRA has now become the epicenter of the RSSI controversy.
On social media, many agrarian reform beneficiaries (ARBs) and small sugar planters continue to ask one simple question: “May bulig bala nga ginhatag para sa RSSI? Kay wala man kami may nabatyagan.”
That question deserves an answer.
Today, ARBs and small planters make up the overwhelming majority of sugar producers in Negros Occidental. They now number roughly 140,000 and account for nearly 80 percent of the province’s sugar production.
Negros Occidental itself supplies approximately 60 percent of the country’s sugar output.
Were these small farmers among those who benefited from the more than P200 million reportedly spent on RSSI containment?
The SRA owes them a clear and transparent accounting. Transparency and accountability are not optional. They are obligations. Farmers deserve to know how public funds were utilized. Otherwise, many ARBs and small planters may eventually abandon sugarcane farming altogether.
The reality is harsh. Most of them simply do not possess the financial resources or the technical expertise to fight RSSI on their own.
Should that happen, the country’s sugar output will inevitably decline, resulting in tighter local supplies and higher prices.
SRA itself projected potential losses of P7 billion from the reinfestation.
So where do we go from here? Will the SRA seize the initiative before the situation worsens? Or will it simply wait for the dust to settle?
Abangan./PN
