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BY AMBASSADOR BAYANI V. MANGIBIN (Ret.)
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Thursday, October 19, 2017
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NY MY last Thursday’s column (Maute, Mautak?, Oct. 12, 2017), the Maute fighters have been considered as “soldiers of fortune” rather than part of the “battalions of God’s fighters.”
I felt sadness in observing the evolution of the Maute Group. I observed that, from its establishment to the present, the Maute fighters preach the ideology of savagery rather than teach the theology of humanity. It has become norm for them to show fit of anger rather than hunger for faith. They have been motivated more by financial favor rather than religious fervor. They pay tribute to money where “IN GOD WE TRUST” is printed rather than pay respect and pray “WE TRUST IN GOD.” They are more profit-inspired than prophet-directed.
The mayors in Lanao del Sur signed a strongly-worded manifesto on Aug. 12, 2017 branding the Maute fighters not as “jihadist” but more as “terrorists” and their leaders as “enemies of the Maranao people.”
The military is the Maute’s nemesis. Unfortunately, I also felt sadness in observing them perform in Marawi (although the military succeeded in killing Isnilon Hapilon and Omar Maute through an information provided by a rescued female teenage hostage).
I do not want to lose confidence to the military as an organization. It will be unfair as they are supposedly there to protect and defend the Filipino people and the country. But the manner the military has been handling the Marawi conflict is a source of concern. I feel sad to note that the individual soldiers, deserving respect, sympathy and support for their sacrifices and bravery, have suffered much because of the organization’s intelligence failure.
Open source information reported the following statistics on casualties on the side of the government forces as of 16 October 2017: 163 killed, 60 missing and more than 1,400 wounded. This statistics provides the context of considering the individual soldiers as “soldiers of misfortune”.
The attack in Marawi did not come as a surprise. The Maute plan was already known by the government as early as December 2016. AFP Chief of Staff General Ano disclosed that the Mautes plan to take over Marawi on the first day of Ramadan (May 27). Instead, the conflict was fast forwarded by the botched raid (May 23) to capture Isnilon Hapilon. This event showed the first sign of intelligence failure.
The protracted Marawi conflict could have ended in a short span of time like the Marawi attack on Oct. 21, 1972 and the Battle of Butig in November 2016 if the military made pre-emptive measures against reinforcement of forces. The military should have taken precaution since Marawi is a well known Maute’s stronghold. This implies the presence of mobile Maute fighters in the area that can be deployed easily in large number in short notice. The unification of four Muslim rebel groups known as “battalions of God’s fighters” indicates a substantial number of available reinforcement forces ready to protect their anointed emir, Isnilon Hapilon.
The military should have immediately sealed off all the entry and exit points to and from Marawi City, such as the inland borders, coastal stretch, the rivers or the forest, Heavily manned and well equipped control points, not a mere checkpoints, should have been established in all strategic locations.
It could have been easier to surround the town, through its strategic areas, and cut off all supplies (food, water, and electricity) prior to the assault. Hunger and thirst debilitate not only the physical strength but also the morale of fighters in the long run. Fighters with empty stomach do desperate act. Sometimes soldiers sold their principle to fight over piece of food and liter of water.
This happened in Iraq. The ferocious elite Iraqi soldiers of the Republican Guard Forces Command (RGFC), who were starved and thirsty, surrendered and chanted in Arabic accent, “Yeorgi Bush”, “Yeorgi Bush” and embraced, some of them even kissed, the US soldiers waving not guns but chocolates in their hands. Some of the macho and most dreaded-looking soldiers even cried despite a television coverage!
Immediately after encircling, sealing off entry and exit points, and establishing control/checkpoints, swift and, if still possible, discreet civilian evacuation should be implemented and managed properly before the airstrikes. Encircling till hunger and thirst make the Mautes debilitated and demoralized and finally surrender out of delusion and frustration is quite an archaic and sluggish tactic but still effective rather than conduct immediately aerial bombings on the first day and massively the following days. The fact that the deaths of Isnilon Hapilon and Omar Maute were the result of ground, not air, attack proves this point.
Airstrikes conducted immediately on the first hours of the reprisal somewhat project knee-jerk reaction. This makes one wonder whether the military had enough time to conduct intelligent assessment on the latest situation.
Updating a plan despite the long time and resources spent in prior planning is imperative to consider last minute strategic changes. This is required to respond appropriately with the fluidity of developments in a crisis phenomenon. Due to this shortcoming, the military underestimated the size, readiness and capability of the Mautes and did not seem to appraise well the terrain of Marawi which is conducive to urban warfare. It should be noted that the Philippine military fights best in jungle but allegedly needs to train more in urban warfare.
The timing of the initial airstrike also puts to doubt whether the military already acquired within short span of time actionable intelligence, particularly the accurate locations of sizable, repeat “sizable”, targets.(Bombing a squad-size of Maute fighters is not tactical, strategic. nor cost effective.) The other question is whether the intel has been vetted and validated.
The other main issue is whether there was enough lead time to manage the evacuation and at least maximize the number of civilians put out of harm’s way before the bombings took place. With the accidental bombings that led to the deaths of soldiers not only once but twice, the civilian confidence on the military’s claim for precision bombing to guarantee civilian safety became a mockery and open up suspicion that the bombings were indiscriminate resulting to enormous destruction of the city on day one alone. There is irony in the criticism that the city was destroyed to save it from ISIS.
The enormity of bombings almost flattened Marawi to look like a wasteland and caused multitude of deaths not only to rebels but also innocent civilians who are clan/tribal members of the Marawi residents. Isnilon Hapilon and Omar Maute were reported dead but the numerous deaths and wanton destructions could generate residues of hate among the Muslims, particularly the young ones, and could foster more radicalization and extremism in Mindanao. It is noted with serious concern that some Marawi children were shocked to see the immense devastation of airstrikes giving them the impression that the military is a destructive force. Thus, some of these children looked up to ISIS as heroes (“Some Marawi children look up to ISIS as heroes” PH sports official”, CNN Philippines, July 27, 2017).
The above concerns put on dark spot the military’s intelligence. It is hoped that the need to meet a deadline in ending quickly the Marawi conflict did not create undue pressure to the military and triggered intelligence breakdown. I hoped that meeting swift deadline is not the real reason for the use of maximum destructive power in combat through airstrikes when alternative tactics with calculated use of force are available. This destructive use of force has prompted Marawi into state of 3 D’s: destruction, displacement and death creating 3 D conditions: dangerous, distressful and desolate.
Isnilon and Omar are dead but the leaders of the other two, out of the four, rebel groups constituting the “battalions of God’s fighters” are still alive. Their ideology is not yet dead. It is Marawi that is in the brink of death and there is the urgent need to resuscitate it and make Marawi rise in peace and prosperity. Paradoxically, there is a need to put to death the ideology of radicalization and extremism to keep Marawi alive – “Bangon Marawi”!
As homage to the Marawi residents and reincarnate their confidence, the government should immediately salvage Marawi that was damaged by aerial bombings and the savaged rampage of the Mautes. There is a need for divine intervention to boost political will and ample resources in giving back life to Marawi. “Bangon Marawi” is easier said than done. It requires the gargantuan tasks of exorcising the evils of extremism, corruption and politicking and exercising unity and cooperation among the multi-stakeholders to make “Bangon Marawi” a reality.
As of this time, there is no fun in Marawi land. It’s more pun!
Let us make “BANGON MARAWI” a priority one! (ambaniman@gmail.com/PN)
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